| LO1 | 01 · Cooperation | explain why cooperation among self-interested parties depends on repetition, detection probability, and error tolerance — and predict how noise or frequency changes destabilize it. |
| LO2 | 02 · Credibility | explain why rational actors can fail to reach deals both prefer (commitment problem), and classify a commitment as cheap talk, sunk costs, or tied hands by what it costs and who punishes retreat. |
| LO3 | 03 · Inspection | explain why optimal inspection is randomized, why the equilibrium violation rate is nonzero, and why announcing the inspection strategy improves deterrence. |
| LO4 | → Part two | state what this primer deliberately leaves to the IR primer — institutional commitment devices (delegation, hardware) and the compliance system (the three R's, detection → attribution → response) — and the shared through-line: every lever runs on detection. |